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A B S T R A C T
Acute stress is generally thought to impair performance on tasks thought to rely on selective attention. This effect
has been well established for moderate to severe stressors, but no study has examined how a mild stressor—the
most common type of stressor—influences selective attention. In addition, no study to date has examined how
stress influences the component processes involved in overall selective attention task performance, such as
controlled attention, automatic attentional activation, decision-making, and motor abilities. To address these
issues, we randomly assigned 107 participants to a mild acute stress or control condition. As expected, the mild
acute stress condition showed a small but significant increase in cortisol relative to the control condition.
Following the stressor, we assessed attention with two separate flanker tasks. One of these tasks was optimized to
investigate component attentional processes using computational cognitive modeling, whereas the other task
employed mouse-tracking to illustrate how response conflict unfolded over time. The results for both tasks
showed that mild acute stress decreased response time (i.e., increased response speed) without influencing ac-
curacy or interference control. Further, computational modeling and mouse-tracking analyses indicated that
these effects were due to faster motor action execution time for chosen actions. Intriguingly, however, cortisol
responses were unrelated to any of the observed effects of mild stress. These results have implications for the-
ories of stress and cognition, and highlight the importance of considering motor processes in understanding the
effects of stress on cognitive task performance.
1. Introduction
The narrative is so common that it borders on public knowledge:
Stress forcefully narrows your attention onto what is stressing you out
at the expense of other things in your surroundings. That elegant nar-
rative reflects the synthesis of numerous studies examining effects of
stress on attention (Joëls et al., 2006; LeBlanc et al., 2015; Mather and
Sutherland, 2011; Sänger et al., 2014; Shields et al., 2016; Wiemers
et al., 2013). However, a limitation of this work is that it has been
restricted to examining relatively severe acute stressors, whereas the
stressors we experience most commonly and most frequently are
relatively mild (Almeida et al., 2002). Importantly, not all stressors
influence cognitive processes in the same ways (Hupbach and Fieman,
2012; Shields et al., 2017; Shields and Yonelinas, 2018), and there is
some evidence that stress may influence some cognitive abilities in an
inverted-U shape function, with mild stress at or near the peak of the
inverted-U (Arnsten, 2009). Therefore, it is unclear whether the stres-
sors we are most likely to encounter impair or enhance selective at-
tention. In the current study we addressed this issue by examining how
a mild acute stressor influenced performance on two implementations
of a selective attention task.
Mild stress is typically defined in human acute stress literature as a
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stressor that produces only a small cortisol response (e.g., Buchanan
and Tranel, 2008; Kunz-Ebrecht et al., 2003; van Stegeren et al., 2008).
For clarity, we define a mild acute stressor as a stressor that, on
average, produces an increase in cortisol relative to not having under-
gone that stressor (i.e., relative to a control condition) but an increase
less than 1.5-fold. We adopt such a definition because laboratory in-
ductions of moderate stress produce a two- to threefold increase in
cortisol (e.g., Oei et al., 2006; Preuß and Wolf, 2009; Schoofs et al.,
2008; Shields et al., 2017b). Although some studies have examined the
effect of mild stress on some cognitive processes (e.g., Gagnon et al.,
2018), the effects of mild stress on most cognitive processes are rela-
tively unknown.
One straightforward route to attenuating the stress of more acute
manipulations is to provide concurrent social support, which robustly
diminishes biological responses to and self-reported distress following a
stressor (Häusser et al., 2012; Hostinar, 2015). Notably, the stress-di-
minutive effects of social support are present even among strangers, as
long as those strangers feel part of a group while undergoing a stressor
(Häusser et al., 2012). Based on this literature, we sought to use one of
the most commonly used stress manipulations—the cold pressor
(Shields et al., 2017)—in concert with social support in the form of
peers experiencing it together.
In a different vein, when considering the effects of stress on cogni-
tion, it is important to move beyond broad behavioral measures of
performance to measuring the cognitive construct of interest. No per-
formance task designed to assess cognitive function is process-pure.
That is, performance on cognitive tasks is the result of both neurocog-
nitive processes relevant to the construct of interest as well as processes
that are irrelevant to the construct of interest (Calanchini et al., 2018).
For example, performance on the flanker task (i.e., a selective attention
task wherein participants respond to a central stimulus and ignore
flanking stimuli) is influenced by the extent to which goal-irrelevant
stimuli capture attention, how well a person can suppress irrelevant
information that has been attended to, and decisional and motor pro-
cesses (Ulrich et al., 2015). Generally, broad behavioral outcomes such
as reaction time cannot distinguish between simultaneous contributions
of multiple neurocognitive processes, and therefore, these measures can
sometimes only crudely approximate the cognitive construct of interest
(Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2018). In this manuscript, we draw on two
methods from cognitive science that facilitate more precise cognitive
assessment: computational cognitive modeling and mouse-tracking.
Computational modeling and mouse-tracking both also offer an-
other insight into the effects of stress that has been largely unstudied in
stress and cognition work: the ability to quantify the effects of stress on
decision and motor processes involved in cognitive task performance
(Freeman et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2015). Although stress influences
both decision and motor processes (Metz et al., 2005; Starcke and
Brand, 2012), to date no work has considered the role of these processes
in understanding the effects of stress on selective attention.
1.1. Current research
The present study sought to address the issues outlined above by
examining the effects of a mild stressor on selective attention.
Participants were first randomly assigned to a mild stress induction or a
control task. Saliva samples were taken pre- and post-manipulation to
assess the success of our mild stress manipulation via cortisol assays.
Selective attention was then assessed with two separate implementa-
tions of the flanker task. First, the classic flanker task, which enabled us
to use computational cognitive modeling in order to determine which
component processes were affected by the mild stressor. Second, a
mouse-tracking flanker, which served both as a within-study replication
of any effects observed in the classic flanker task and to provide con-
tinuous motor data on flanker task trials, allowed us to determine how
effects of the mild stressor on selective attention develop over time.
Because moderate-to-severe stress impairs selective attention, we
expected the mild stressor to impair performance on the flanker, and to
do so by impairing controlled attention rather than increasing auto-
matic attentional activation, though we expected stress to alter motor
and decisional processes also involved in task performance.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
107 (79 female) young adults (Mage= 21.50, SDage= 3.39, range:
18–46) attending UC Davis participated in this study. A sample size of
50 participants per group was chosen because it provided 80% power to
detect a moderate effect (d= 0.50) in an expected direction.
Participants were randomly assigned to the mild acute stress induction
(n= 50; 37 female) or control condition (n= 57; 42 female). Due to
random chance (i.e., no significant difference between stress and con-
trol conditions, χ2(1)= 0.46, p= .499), fewer participants came to
stress induction timeslots than control timeslots, and to ensure no dif-
ferences in condition constituency by time of quarter, we continued
running control participant timeslots until the stress induction condi-
tion reached 50 participants. Excluding the last seven control partici-
pants or randomly sampling seven control participants to exclude
produced identical results to keeping the full sample, so we retained the
full sample. The sample was fairly racially/ethnically diverse; 44.9%
identified as Asian, 28.0% White, 22.4% Hispanic, 3.7% Black/African
American, and 0.9% as Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Stress manipulation
Participants in the stress condition completed a modified cold
pressor test (Hines and Brown, 1932). An experimenter wearing casual
clothing (i.e., not a laboratory coat) instructed participants to submerge
their arm in ice water (M=2.37℃) up to the wrist joint without
making a fist for 3min. They were further reminded immediately before
the stressor that they had the option to discontinue their study parti-
cipation at any time—no participants opted to discontinue. Participants
in each timeslot were seated next to each other during the stressor and
could interact with each other during that time (Häusser et al., 2012).
These modifications functioned to reduce the stressfulness of the cold
pressor (see Häusser et al., 2012).
Participants in the control condition were instructed as a group by
an experimenter wearing normal clothing that they were required to
submerge their arm in lukewarm water (M=21.84℃) up to the wrist
joint without making a fist for 3min. They were also reminded that they
had the option to discontinue their study participation at any time.
Participants in each timeslot in the control condition were also seated
next to each other during the control task and could interact with each
other during that time.
2.2.2. Cortisol
Participants provided saliva samples via passive drool, which were
immediately placed in a -20℃ freezer until being assayed. Cortisol as-
says were conducted by G.S.S. and M.M.R. at the Behavioral
Neuroendocrinology Lab at UC Davis using high-sensitivity ELISA kits
from Salimetrics. Conditions were counterbalanced across plates; each
plate contained an approximately equal number of timepoints from
participants in the stress and control conditions. Intra-assay CV was
5.20% (range: 2.82–7.70%); inter-assay CV was 7.21%. All controls
were in the expected ranges. Assay sensitivity was<0.007 μg/dL.
Values are given in nmol/L.
2.2.3. Negative affect
To verify the manipulation, current negative affect was assessed
using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al.,
1988). Participants were asked to report the extent to which they
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currently felt 10 negative and 10 positive emotions (20 items total).
Responses to each item were provided on a 1 (Very slightly or not at all)
to 5 (Extremely) scale, and responses to the 10 questions assessing ne-
gative affect were then averaged to create an overall index of negative
affect, with higher scores indicating more negative affect. Internal
consistency for the scale was good both pre- and post-manipulation,
αs≥.85.
2.2.4. Classic flanker task
Selective attention was assessed in part by completion of the Eriksen
flanker task, coded by G.S.S. in PEBL (Mueller and Piper, 2014). The
task began with a series of instruction screens informing participants to
report the direction of the center arrow using the left or right arrow key
on a keyboard. The instructions also stated that the center arrow would
be flanked by two arrows on both sides pointing in the same direction
(congruent trials), two arrows on both sides pointing in a different di-
rection (incongruent trials), or nothing (neutral trials), and that any
flanking arrows should be ignored. The instructions further stated to
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. After the instructions,
20 practice trials were presented and accuracy feedback was given for
400ms after responses. The test phase began after a brief reminder of
instructions; no accuracy feedback was given during the test phase. The
test phase consisted of 520 trials divided into four blocks (130 trials per
block). This number of trials is sufficient for good to excellent para-
meter recovery for the Diffusion Model for Conflict Tasks (White et al.,
2018). Each block contained 52 congruent trials, 52 incongruent trials,
and 26 neutral trials, for a total of 208 congruent trials, 208 incon-
gruent trials, and 104 neutral trials. The center arrow pointed left in
half the trials of each type (i.e., congruent, incongruent, and neutral)
and right in the other half of the trials of each type. After each block of
trials, participants reached a screen that displayed their progress, were
told to take as long of a break as they wanted, and to press “c” to
continue when ready.
In each trial, a fixation cross was presented in the center of the
screen for 500ms and was subsequently replaced by the target and
flanking stimuli (if not a neutral trial) until a response was provided or
2000ms had elapsed. If the response to a trial took longer than 800ms,
“try to respond faster” was displayed during the intertrial interval (ITI);
if the response to a trial occurred within 800ms, no additional text was
displayed during the ITI. The ITI lasted for 500ms.
2.2.5. MouseTracker flanker task
Participants completed the second flanker task within
MouseTracker, which is an extensively validated mouse-tracking pro-
gram (Freeman and Ambady, 2010). To our knowledge, this is the first
study to implement a mouse-tracker flanker task, but numerous mouse-
tracking studies have implemented similar tasks (e.g., Hermens, 2018).
Participants received instructions asking them to “quickly and ac-
curately” respond to the letter (either “A” or “B”) appearing in the
center of a string of 5 letters. Letters were used rather than arrows to
help distinguish this task from the traditional flanker task, helping to
ensure that any converging results were not due to stimulus processing
or familiarity. Following instructions, participants completed 8 practice
trials and then a single test block of 48 trials for a total of 56 trials
(though only the 48 test trials were analyzed). Half of the trials (i.e., 4
practice and 24 test trials) consisted of congruent stimulus arrays—-
where both flanker and target letters converged on the same response
(e.g., “AAAAA”). The other half of trials (i.e., 4 practice and 24 test
trials) consisted of incongruent stimulus arrays—where flanker and
target letters were associated with different responses (e.g., “BBABB”).
Letter stimuli were presented in 44px Times New Roman font.
To begin each trial, participants clicked a box at the bottom-center
of the screen. The flanker stimulus array appeared immediately upon
clicking start and was centered both horizontally and vertically. To
indicate their response, participants had to click a box located in the
upper-left or upper-right corner of the screen. For half of participants,
response choice “A” was located in the upper left and “B” was located in
the upper right of the screen, and this response mapping was counter-
balanced between-participants.
Participants were required to respond within 1500ms of stimulus
onset and were told to “Please respond faster!” if they exceeded this
limit. Additionally, initiation of mouse movement was required within
500ms of stimulus onset with a warning to “Please start moving ear-
lier” if participants exceeded this limit. Trials were terminated if either
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of the study procedure. Post-
manipulation and after saliva collection, participants com-
pleted two separate implementations of the Flanker task: the
classic flanker, wherein only a single behavioral response was
assessed for each trial, followed by the MouseTracker flanker,
wherein mouse trajectories in responses were assessed.
G.S. Shields, et al. Psychoneuroendocrinology 108 (2019) 78–86
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of these requirements was not met. Following errors, participants were
shown a red “X” for 2000ms. Each trial began after a 500ms ITI.
2.3. Procedure
Fig. 1 illustrates the study procedure. Participants came to the lab at
either 10am or 11am in groups of two-to-four for a one-hour timeslot.
Upon arrival, each participant was greeted by an experimenter who
instructed the participant to rinse their mouth out with a provided glass
of purified water. Once all participants arrived, they provided informed
consent and subsequently completed filler questionnaires for 10min to
allow acclimation to the lab. The experimenter then collected a saliva
sample (baseline) from each participant. Participants then completed
the pre-manipulation affect assessment. Once all participants had fin-
ished the pre-manipulation affect assessment, the experimenter in-
troduced the stress or control task. After completing the stress or con-
trol task, participants immediately completed the post-manipulation
affect assessment and then subsequently completed a novel time per-
ception task as a filler task, which took approximately 10min. A time
perception task was chosen to retain participants’ study engagement
without making demands on executive control. After 10min post-ma-
nipulation-offset (13min post-manipulation-onset) had elapsed, the
experimenter collected a second saliva sample (post-manipulation)
from each participant. Participants then completed the classic flanker
task (15min post-manipulation-onset). After completing the classic
flanker task, participants completed the MouseTracker flanker task.
Upon completion, participants were debriefed outside of the experi-
ment room and dismissed.
2.4. Data reduction and analysis
2.4.1. Computational modeling
Classic flanker task data were fit to the diffusion model for conflict
tasks (DMC; Ulrich et al., 2015)—a task-general model designed to fit
any response-competition task, such as the flanker. This model posits
that response selection is driven by superimposed automatic (i.e.,
bottom-up) and controlled (i.e., top-down) attentional processes. The
automatic attentional process is modeled as a scaled gamma function,
which begins the trial at zero, reaches a maximum after a short delay,
and approaches zero thereafter—fitting empirical literature showing
that task-irrelevant information has its strongest effect early and less
effect as a trial continues (Dyer, 1971; Ulrich et al., 2015). The peak
amplitude (i.e., the size, A), shape (a), and scale (τ) of this gamma
function are fit as model parameters. The controlled attentional process
is modeled as a Wiener diffusion process with a constant drift rate (μc),
indicating the strength of the controlled process (i.e., higher μc equal
stronger controlled attention). Once evidence accumulation for a re-
sponse reaches a certain threshold (i.e., the decision boundary, b), the
selected response is encoded into a motor action and executed during
some nondecision time (μR) that exhibits trial-to-trial variability (σR).
The model further fits variability in the starting point of the decision
process with a final parameter describing the shape of the beta dis-
tribution of response starting points (α) that is constrained by the de-
cision boundary (b), reflecting the fact that on some trials participants
are primed with a certain response (e.g., after three left-arrow trials in a
row, participants are primed to respond with “left” on a fourth trial).
The standard deviation of this starting point distribution (σX(0)) is cal-
culable given α and b.
The model was fit to each participant’s data. Due to space limita-
tions, the model fitting procedure is described within the Supplemental
Material.
2.4.2. Analytic strategy
Following Ulrich et al. (2015), trials from the classic flanker with
response times shorter than 200ms or longer than 1200ms were dis-
carded (0.26% of all trials); although the model was only fit to these
trimmed data, raw behavioral results were virtually identical when all
trials were included. All analyses were conducted in R, version 3.4.3.
The function for simulating DMC trials was coded in C++ and called
using the Rcpp package, version 0.12.17. The subplex optimization
algorithm was called from the subplex package, version 1.5-4. Because
of the randomization of timeslots, rather than participants, to condi-
tions, all models including between-subjects effects (i.e., analyses not
solely restricted to examining flanker effects within subjects) were
linear mixed models nesting participants within timeslots. Linear mixed
models were fit using the lmerTest package, version 3.0-1, and model
estimated marginal means and corresponding standard errors were
derived using the lsmeans package, version 2.27-62. To facilitate future
meta-analyses, effect sizes were calculated from raw values. Re-
sidualized changes in cortisol for use in correlational analyses—used
because they are more reliable than simple difference scores (Cronbach
and Furby, 1970)—were calculated by regressing log-transformed post-
manipulation cortisol on log-transformed pre-manipulation cortisol.
Using simple difference scores (i.e., Δ-cortisol) in analyses produced
virtually identical results.
3. Results
3.1. Preliminary analyses
3.1.1. Negative affect
We first examined whether our mild stress manipulation was suc-
cessful by examining changes in negative affect from pre- to post-ma-
nipulation. As hypothesized, the Time×Stress (i.e., experimental
condition) interaction was significant, F(1, 107.0)= 23.40, p < .0001.
Decomposing this interaction, we found that participants in the stress
induction condition increased from baseline (M=1.37, SE=0.07) to
post-manipulation (M=1.65, SE=0.07), t(107.0)= 4.72, p < .0001,
whereas participants in the control condition decreased in negative
affect from baseline (M=1.49, SE=0.07) to post-manipulation
(M=1.35, SE=0.07), t(107.0)= 2.04, p= .044.
3.1.2. Cortisol
We then examined the effect of our mild stress manipulation on
cortisol. As hypothesized, the Time×Stress interaction was significant,
F(1, 99.8)= 8.70, p= .004. Decomposing this interaction, we found
that participants in the stress condition increased from baseline
(M=7.76, SE=0.72) to post-manipulation (M=9.31, SE=0.72), t
(99.7)= 3.64, p < .001, whereas participants in the control condition
did not change from baseline (M=8.29, SE=0.67) to post-manip-
ulation (M=8.11, SE =0.67), t(99.8) = -0.44, p= .659. However,
consistent with expectations of the mildness of the stressor, the stress
condition did not show the standard twofold-or-greater increase in
cortisol, but instead showed a small 1.20-fold increase in cortisol. In
fact, the effect of our manipulation on cortisol was significantly smaller
than the effect of stress on cortisol within other studies of stress and
cognition: The effect size of our stress manipulation on cortisol
(gppc= 0.296) was outside the 95% confidence interval (gppc= 0.777,
CI95% [0.354, 1.201]) of the effect size of the cold pressor on cortisol at
the same delay between stress and saliva collection in a recent meta-
analysis (Shields et al., 2017).1 Thus, our mild stress manipulation was
successful.
1 This confidence interval was not published in Shields et al. (2017), but is a
secondary analysis estimating the effect of the cold pressor on cortisol at our
13min delay between stressor onset and saliva sample collection. Of note, one
study in that meta-analysis used this exact delay, and the effect size in that
study (gppc=0.738) was nearly identical to the meta-analytic estimated effect at
that delay (gppc=0.777), indicating that the estimated meta-analytic effect is
very accurate with this stressor and delay.
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3.2. Primary analyses2
3.2.1. Classic flanker task
We analyzed the effects of stress on flanker performance in a mixed-
model ANOVA, nesting trials within participants and participants
within timeslots, and examined the fixed effects of Trial, Congruence,
and Stress (i.e., experimental condition) on response times and errors.
We observed classic flanker effects: Participants made, on average,
14.20 more errors on incongruent trials (M = 19.49) than congruent
trials (M=5.29), t(106)= 6.45, p < .0001, dz= 0.62, CI95% [9.83,
18.56], and they correctly responded, on average, 40.76ms slower on
incongruent trials (M=447.16ms) than congruent trials
(M=487.92ms), t(106)= 26.08, p < .0001, dz= 2.52, CI95% [37.66,
43.86].
3.2.1.1. Errors. We found a significant Stress× Congruence effect on
the likelihood of committing an error, χ2(1)= 18.03, p< .0001.
However, a closer examination of the data revealed that two control
participants performed worse than chance on incongruent trials3 (see
Supplementary Fig. 1), each having committed over 130 errors to
incongruent trials (out of a total of 260). Therefore, this Stress effect on
the likelihood of committing an error was likely driven by including
these two outliers. As such, we excluded these participants and reran
the analyses. After excluding the outliers, the Stress× Congruence
interaction was no longer significant, χ2(1)= 0.13, p= .714, and no
main effect of or interaction with Stress was significant, ps> .159.
Participants in the stress induction group committed the same number
of errors as participants in the control condition on both incongruent
trials (Mstress = 16.27, Mcontrol = 17.06), t(54.8)= -0.28, p= .783,
d= -0.06, CI95% [-6.49, 4.92], and congruent trials (Mstress= 5.22,
Mcontrol= 5.31), t(105.0)= -0.07, p= .944, d= -0.01, CI95% [-2.61,
2.43]. There were no interactions of Stress or Stress× Congruence with
Trial, ps> .420, indicating that accuracy did not differentially change
over the course of the task by condition. Thus, our stress manipulation
did not influence error rates on the flanker task.
3.2.1.2. Response time. The nonsignificant effect of Stress on response
time, F(1, 45.0)= 2.59, p= .114, was qualified by a significant
Stress×Trial interaction, F(1, 44263)= 33.35, p < .0001 (Fig. 2).
The Stress× Congruence and Stress× Trial× Congruence interaction
effects were not significant, ps > .439, indicating that flanker
interference effects did not differ between stress and control groups.
Decomposing the Stress×Trial interaction, participants in the stress
condition (M= 456.39, SE= 6.82) responded approximately 22.65ms
faster to trials at the beginning of the task (i.e., the model-estimated
first test block trial) than did control participants (M=479.04,
SE=6.52), t(46.4)= -2.40, p= .020, d= -0.50, 95% CIdiff [-41.64,
-3.67], but this difference was no longer detectable by the end of the
task (Mstress = 464.67, SEstress= 6.82; Mcontrol = 472.11,
SEcontrol = 6.52), t(46.4)= -0.79, p= .434, d=-0.16, 95% CIdiff
[-26.43, 11.55] (see Fig. 2). Sensitivity analyses determined that
participants in the stress condition responded significantly faster than
participants in the control condition for approximately the first 129
trials (ps ≤ .0499), then did not differ in subsequent trials (ps≥ .0500).
Removing the participants mentioned above who committed an
exorbitant number of errors to incongruent trials did not affect the
results; the Stress×Trial interaction effect remained significant, F(1,
43458)= 22.14, p < .0001, and decomposing the interaction showed
the same pattern of results. In sum, regardless of trial congruency,
participants in the stress condition responded significantly faster than
participants in the control condition during the first half of the task.
3.2.2. Computational modeling
The diffusion model for conflict tasks (DMC) provided an excellent
fit to the data (see Fig. 3), with the average parameter values explaining
over 99% of the variance in flanker response distributions (i.e.,
R2congruent= .999 and R2incongruent = .997) and over 90% of the variance
in flanker error distributions (i.e., R2congruent= .900 and
R2incongruent = .991) across participants’ average Vincentized distribu-
tions.
After fitting the DMC, we examined effects of the mild stress ma-
nipulation on DMC parameters. Critically, nondecision time (i.e., time
taken to encode and execute a chosen motor action) was significantly
faster in the stress group (M=369.80ms, SE=6.28) than in the con-
trol group (M=389.77ms, SE=6.10), t(37.8)= -2.28, p= .028, d= -
0.46, 95% CIdiff [-32.02ms, -2.69ms] (Fig. 4). No other model para-
meter differed between the stress and control groups, ps > .136
(Table 1). Therefore, the mild stress manipulation enhanced motor
action execution time without significantly influencing any other
component process in the flanker task.
We present analyses examining the effects of stress on nondecision
time during the first half and the second half of the task in
Supplemental Material.
3.2.3. MouseTracker
For analyses of participants’ mouse-tracking data, we analyzed trials
with correct identifications and the response latency criteria for deci-
sions and movement initiation were met (97.88% of trials). We ob-
served classic flanker effects within this task: participants made, on
average, 0.22 more errors on incongruent trials (M= 0.29) than con-
gruent trials (M=0.07), t(106)= 2.97, p= .004, dz= 0.29, CI95%
[0.07, 0.37], and they responded, on average, 99.57ms slower on in-
congruent trials (M=944.69ms) than congruent trials
(M=845.12ms), t(106)= 21.37, p < .0001, dz= 2.07, CI95% [90.33,
108.80]. We also observed novel flanker effects within the
MouseTracker flanker implementation: mouse-tracking measures in-
dicative of response conflict showed flanker interference effects. In
particular, participants’ area under the curve (AUC; i.e., the geometric
area between an actual trajectory and the ideal trajectory) was sig-
nificantly larger on incongruent trials (M=1.71) than congruent trials
(M=0.68), t(106)= 20.74, p < .0001, dz= 2.01, CI95% [0.93, 1.13].
Similarly, participants’ maximum deviation (i.e., the largest perpendi-
cular deviation between an actual trajectory and the ideal trajectory to
the correct response) was significantly larger on incongruent trials
(M=0.80) than congruent trials (M=0.38), t(106)= 22.59,
Fig. 2. Response time by trial by condition. Participants in the stress condition
responded faster than participants in the control condition at the beginning of
the task, but the groups converged to statistical equivalence by the end of the
task. Bars for each trial represent mean ± SE for each condition on each trial.
Lines are loess smooths fit to each condition’s trial data.
2 Controlling for sex did not influence any of these results.
3 Curiously, these participants were not outliers in congruent errors, nor did
they only select one response option, fail to respond to multiple trials, or re-
spond so fast as to indicate random button pressing. Similarly, these partici-
pants were not outliers in flanker interference effects on response time.
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p < .0001, dz= 2.18, CI95% [0.38, 0.46]. Additionally, although not a
measure of spatial attraction to the opposite response, the time to
maximum deviation was significantly greater in incongruent trials
(M=475.25ms) than congruent trials (M=405.73ms), t
(106)= 23.05, p < .0001, dz= 2.23, CI95% [62.63, 74.41].
Participants’ time to begin moving the mouse did not significantly differ
between incongruent (M=109.45ms) and congruent trials
(M=110.03ms), t(106)= -0.28, p= .779, dz= -0.03, CI95% [-4.66,
3.51].
For our critical tests, we compared effects of stress in a mixed-model
ANOVA, nesting congruence type within participants and participants
within timeslots, and examined the fixed effects of Congruence and
Stress on the above MouseTracker flanker dependent variables. We
found significant effects of Stress on response time, F(1, 44.8)= 5.35,
p= .025, and time to maximum deviation, F(1, 48.3)= 11.40,
p= .001, but not on error rates, AUC, maximum deviation, or time to
begin mouse movement, ps > .245. All Stress× Congruence interac-
tion effects were nonsignificant, ps > .243, indicating that flanker in-
terference effects did not differ between groups. Examining effects of
Stress on response time, participants in the stress group responded
faster than participants in the control group to both incongruent trials
(Mstress = 913.39ms, Mcontrol= 975.38ms), t(47.8)= -2.40, p= .020,
d=-0.48, CI95% [-113.91, -10.06], and congruent trials
(Mstress = 817.28ms, Mcontrol= 872.78ms), t(47.8)= -2.15, p= .037,
d=-0.44, CI95% [-107.43, -3.58] (Fig. 5a). Similarly, examining effects
of Stress on time to maximum deviation, participants in the stress group
reached their maximum deviation points faster than control partici-
pants on both incongruent trials (Mstress= 456.63ms,
Mcontrol = 490.83ms), t(56.3)= -3.17, p= .002, d=-0.63, CI95%
[-55.81, -12.58], and congruent trials (Mstress = 387.21,
Mcontrol = 423.09ms), t(56.3)= -3.32, p= .002, d=-0.67, CI95%
[-57.49, -14.26] (Fig. 5b). In sum, participants in the stress group
moved the mouse in the same way as participants in the control group,
but participants in the stress group moved it—and therefore re-
sponded—faster.
3.2.4. Correlations with cortisol
Changes in cortisol from pre- to post-manipulation were not corre-
lated with any variable influenced by the mild stress manipulation. In
particular, changes in cortisol were unassociated with response times to
congruent and incongruent trials in the classic flanker task, |r|s < .05,
ps > .622, motor action execution time quantified by computational
modeling, r= .01, p= .920, total response time on the MouseTracker
flanker, r= -.14, p= .144, and time to maximum deviation on the
MouseTracker flanker, r=-.09, p= .384. Removing the two outlying
participants on incongruent errors did not change any of these results,
ps > .183. Examining these associations within the stress group alone
did not change any of these results, ps > .114. Further exploratory
analyses found no associations between cortisol changes and inter-
ference effects (in response times, errors, or novel MouseTracker
flanker interference effects), ps > .274.
4. Discussion
Stress narrows your attention onto whatever is most stressful at the
Fig. 3. Model fits for the average diffusion model for conflict (DMC) to the
Vincent average cumulative distribution function (CDF) and conditional accu-
racy function (CAF). The DMC was an excellent fit to the data.
Fig. 4. Effects of the stress manipulation on nondecision time (i.e., selected
motor action execution time) as fit by the DMC. Participants in the stress
condition showed faster nondecision times, indicating a faster execution of
chosen motor actions. No other model parameter differed between groups.
*p < .05.
Table 1
Parameter Means and Standard Errors for Each Condition.
Stress Condition Control Condition
Parameter Mean (SE) Mean (SE) pdiff
A 24.48 (1.75) 26.62 (1.64) .375
a 1.77 (0.05) 1.85 (0.05) .262
τ 215.74 (12.60) 208.09 (11.80) .659
μc 0.673 (0.023) 0.659 (0.022) .663
b 62.56 (1.81) 59.01 (1.70) .157
μR 369.80 (6.28) 389.77 (6.10) .028
σR 26.81 (2.59) 32.32 (2.52) .137
α 3.09 (0.28) 3.00 (0.26) .819
Note: A=size of automatic attention gamma function, a=shape of automatic
attention gamma function, τ=scale of automatic attention gamma function,
μc=drift rate of controlled attention (larger means better controlled attention),
b=decision boundary (larger means a preference for accuracy in speed/accu-
racy tradeoff), μR=mean nondecision time, σR=standard deviation of non-
decision time, α=shape parameter for beta distribution of variability in starting
point of evidence accumulation (higher means less variability in starting point
of evidence accumulation). More detail on each of these parameters is given in
the Method section and Supplemental Material.
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expense of attentional control—or so the synthesis of prior literature
suggests (Shields et al., 2016). Our results show that this simple yet
elegant account of stress effects on attention is perhaps too simple. In
particular, we found that a mild stressor decreased response times in
two implementations of the flanker task without influencing accuracy,
response caution (i.e., speed-accuracy tradeoffs), or controlled or au-
tomatic attention. Moreover, as shown by computational cognitive
modeling and analyses of mouse-tracking data, this improvement is
specifically due to an enhancement of motor action execution time.
These results therefore show that acute stress does not universally im-
pair controlled attentional processes by forcibly narrowing attention
onto stress-relevant information. Instead, mild acute stress—the stress
that we experience most often (Almeida et al., 2002)—can decrease
response times in selective attention tasks. Intriguingly, though, pre- to
post-manipulation changes in cortisol were unassociated with any of
these effects.
These results have numerous implications for both theories and
assessments of stress effects on attention (and executive functions). In
particular, theories of stress effects on attention have focused primarily
or exclusively on the cognitive effects of stress without acknowledging
the role that motor response execution plays in tasks designed to assess
attention (Easterbrook, 1959; LeBlanc et al., 2015; Mather and
Sutherland, 2011; Shields et al., 2016, 2015). Our results demonstrate
that stress has important effects on these overlooked motor processes.
Without a process-level investigation using computational cognitive
modeling or mouse-tracking—such that the processes underlying overt
responding can be decomposed—it may have been tempting to spec-
ulate, based on raw behavioral data (i.e., error rates and mean latency),
that stress-induced improvements in response time were due to im-
provements in sustained attention. For example, if selective attention
was unaffected, better sustained attention would result in earlier sti-
mulus detection without altering measures of response conflict (i.e.,
flanker effects) or errors. These results would have then been taken to
show that mild stress can improve sustained attention, suggesting an
inverted-U effect of stress on controlled attention. However, because we
utilized more precise measures, we showed that this interpretation is
unlikely. Namely, the lack of difference between the groups in varia-
bility in the starting point of evidence accumulation (quantified by
computational modeling) and the lack of group difference in the initial
time to move the mouse (quantified by MouseTracker) both suggest
that our results were not driven by differences in sustained attention
(Bonnelle et al., 2011; Shields, 2017; Stuss et al., 1989). These results
therefore entail that theories of stress and cognition should consider
motor processes involved in tasks designed to assess cognitive function
and whether effects on those processes may explain any observed re-
sults. Additionally, these results suggest that outcomes that help dis-
ambiguate motor from cognitive processes—such as computational
cognitive modeling, mouse-tracking, and eye-tracking (Farrell and
Lewandowsky, 2018; Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman and Ambady,
2010; Glaholt and Reingold, 2011; Ramey et al., 2019)—are important
for understanding stress effects on attention, and, more broadly, on
cognition as a whole.
The observed result of an initial effect of stress decreasing response
time on the classic flanker that converged to statistical equivalence by
the task’s end coupled with an effect of stress decreasing response time
on the shorter MouseTracker flanker task could support the idea that
novelty is important for producing the effects of stress on cognitive
tasks. Stress effects on cognition differ when tasks are well rehearsed
(Arnsten, 2009). Because stress shifts actions from controlled to auto-
matic (e.g., Schwabe et al., 2011), the mild stress manipulation may
have caused a bypass of the normal gradual shift from monitoring the
execution of chosen motor actions to an unmonitored, automatic ex-
ecution of chosen motor actions. In short, our results suggest that no-
velty might influence the effects of stress on cognition.
Although these results diverge from prior analyses examining effects
of moderate-to-severe stress on selective attention, which generally find
that moderate-to-severe stress impairs selective attention (Sänger et al.,
2014; Shields et al., 2016; Vinski and Watter, 2013), they are in line
with findings that acute stress can improve control over motor actions
(Schwabe et al., 2013; Shields et al., 2016). It is tempting to speculate
that the effects of stress on motor actions require a lower stress
threshold than effects of stress on cognition, given the obvious benefit
of greater and faster motor control for fight-or-flight. However, we did
not assess outcomes indicative of response inhibition, which is the
component of control over motor actions prior research has found to be
enhanced by stress (Dierolf et al., 2018; Schwabe et al., 2013; Shields
et al., 2016). As such, it is unknown whether the enhancing effects of
mild stress on motor action execution stem from the same mechanism
as effects of stress on response inhibition.
Like with studies examining effects of moderate-to-severe stress on
selective attention, these results differ from prior studies examining
effects of moderate-to-severe stress on reaction time, which have gen-
erally found that moderate-to-severe stress slows reaction time on a
variety of task types (Banks et al., 2014; Mahoney et al., 2007;
McMorris et al., 2006; Sänger et al., 2014). However, because these
studies did not utilize computational cognitive modeling or a similar
Fig. 5. Significant group differences
from MouseTracker analyses. Although
there were no differences in indices of
response conflict (e.g., area under the
curve) or in the time taken to begin
moving the mouse, participants in the
stress condition showed shorter re-
sponse times to the entire trial and a
faster time to maximum deviation than
participants in the control condition.
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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method to decompose performance into underlying processes, it is
difficult to know whether these impairing effects are due to impairing
effects of stress on sustained attention or on motor action execution
time per se. As such, it is possible that mild and moderate-to-severe
stress differentially influence motor action execution time. Alter-
natively, it is possible that stressors of all severity improve motor action
execution time, but this improvement to motor execution time is
dwarfed by impairments in sustained attention (leading to slower sti-
mulus detection times and therefore slower response times) caused by
more severe stress. These possibilities suggest that parametrically ma-
nipulating stress severity is an important next step in understanding
differential effects of stressors of differing severity on attention and
motor performance.
Some study limitations should be noted. First, although our results
show what the effects of a mild stressor on flanker performance are, we
did not parametrically manipulate stress severity. These results are thus
informative for understanding the effects of mild stress, but they cannot
conclusively speak to how these effects differ from more the effects of
severe stress. Second, due to timing constraints, we did not capture the
cortisol peak post-stressor. Although our mild acute stress manipulation
produced a cortisol response significantly smaller than the standard
cold pressor task at the same delay between stressor onset and saliva
sample collection, it is possible that cortisol may have been related to
the effects of stress had we sampled it at a different time post-stressor.
Third, the tasks used in this study were presented in a fixed order,
which may have resulted in different effects of stress on one or both
tasks than would have been observed if these tasks were switched,
given the time-dependent nature of the stress response. Fourth, we did
not explicitly instruct participants to develop a social identity as did
Häusser et al. (2012), which may have contributed to individual dif-
ferences in how the stressor was construed and may have resulted in
some participants experiencing the stressor as more stressful than
others. Fifth, we did not assess women’s menstrual cycles, nor did we
exclude women taking hormonal contraceptives, which limits our
ability to determine how either of these factors may alter the effects we
observed; future research should therefore attempt to determine if
phase of the menstrual cycle or contraceptive usage alters any of the
effects we observed. Finally, the participants in this study were all
undergraduates. Although we have no strong a priori reason to expect
stress effects on motor and cognitive processes differ within different
populations, these effects may differ in other populations (Henrich
et al., 2010).
4.1. Conclusion
In conclusion, we found that mild acute stress improves response
speed without affecting accuracy or interference control in two im-
plementations of a selective attention task within a large sample of
healthy young adults. At the process level, we found that this im-
provement in response speed was due to mild stress improving motor
action execution. These same process-level analyses indicated that mild
stress did not impact other component decision processes, such as au-
tomatic or controlled attention, response caution, or variability in
motor or attentional processes. These findings come with numerous
theoretical implications, including that future work examining effects
of stress on cognitive processes should not ignore effects of stress on
motor processes as is often done, nor should it ignore the severity of the
stress manipulation used, again as is often the case.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the
online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2019.06.
001.
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